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Abstract
We investigate whether the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) can explain UK ination in
the 1970s. We confront the identication problem involved by setting up the FTPL as a structural
model for the episode and pitting it against an alternative Orthodox model; the models have a reduced
form that is common in form but, because each model is over-identied, numerically distinct. We use
indirect inference to test which model could be generating the VECM approximation to the reduced
form that we estimate on the data for the episode. Neither model is rejected, though the Orthodox
model outperforms the FTPL. But the best account of the period assumes that expectations were a
probability-weighted combination of the two regimes.
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cation; Testing; Indirect infer-
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1 Introduction
In 1972 the UK government oated the pound while pursuing highly expansionary scal policies whose aim
was to reduce rising unemployment. To control ination the government introduced statutory wage and
price controls. Monetary policy was given no targets for either the money supply or ination; interest
rates were held at rates that would accommodate growth and falling unemployment. Since wage and
price controls would inevitably break down faced with the inationary eects of such policies, this period
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appears to t rather well with the policy requirements of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: scal
policy appears to have been non-Ricardian (not limited by concerns with solvency) and monetary policy
accommodative to ination - in the language of Leeper (1991) scal policy was `active' and monetary
policy was `passive'. Furthermore, there was no reason to believe that this policy regime would come to
an end: both Conservative and Labour parties won elections in the 1970s and both pursued essentially the
same policies. While Margaret Thatcher won the Conservative leadership in 1975 and also the election
in 1979, during the period we study here it was not assumed that the monetarist policies she advocated
would ever occur, since they were opposed by the two other parties, by a powerful group in her own party,
as well as by the senior civil service. Only after her election and her actual implementation of them was
this a reasonable assumption. So it appears that in the period from 1972 to 1979 there was a prevailing
policy regime which was expected to continue. These are key assumptions about the policy environment;
besides this narrative background we also check them empirically below.
Under FTPL the price level or ination is determined by the need to impose scal solvency; thus it
is set at the value necessary for the government's intertemporal budget constraint to hold at the market
value of outstanding debt. Given this determinate price level, money supply growth, interest rates and
output are determined recursively as the values required by the rest of the model to permit this price
level.
The FTPL has been set out and developed in Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1997), Woodford (1996,
1998, 2001) and Cochrane (2001, 2005) - see also comments by McCallum (2001, 2003) and Buiter (1999,
2002), and for surveys Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2000). Empirical tests have been proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), Bohn
(1998), Cochrane (1999), Woodford (1998b) and Davig et al. (2007). Loyo (2000) for example argues
that Brazilian policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s was non-Ricardian and that the FTPL provides
a persuasive explanation for Brazil's high ination during that time. The work of Tanner and Ramos
(2003) also nds evidence of scal dominance for the case of Brazil for some important periods. Cochrane
(1999, 2005) argues that the FTPL with a statistically exogenous surplus process explains the dynamics
of U.S. ination in the 1970s. This appears to be similar to what we see in the UK during the 1970s.
With scal policy of this type, the nancial markets - forced to price the resulting supplies of govern-
ment bonds - will take a view about future ination and set interest rates and bond prices accordingly.
It will set bond prices so that the government's solvency is assured ex post (i.e. in equilibrium); thus it
will be ensuring that buyers of the bonds are paying a fair price. Future ination is expected because if
the bonds were priced at excessive value then consumers would have wealth to spend, in that their bonds
would be worth more than their future tax liabilities; this would generate excess demand which would
drive up ination. However this mechanism would only come into play out of equilibrium. We would not
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observe it because markets anticipate it and so drive interest rates and expected ination up in advance;
ination follows because of the standard Phillips Curve mechanism by which workers and rms raise
ination in line with expected ination. Thus the FTPL can be regarded as a particular policy regime
within a sequence of dierent policy regimes.
Our aim in this paper is to test the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) as applied to the
UK in the 1970s episode we described above. Cochrane (1999, 2001, and 2005) has noted that there
is a basic identication problem aecting the FTPL: in the FTPL scal policy is exogenous and forces
ination to close the government constraint while monetary policy is endogenous and responds to that
given ination. But similar economic behaviour can be consistent with an exogenous monetary policy
determining ination in the `orthodox' way, with Ricardian scal policy endogenously responding to the
government budget constraint to ensure solvency given that ination path - what we will call the Orthodox
model. Thus there is a besetting problem in the empirical literature we have cited above, that equations
that appear to reect the FTPL and are used to `test' it, could also be implied by the Orthodox set-up.
To put it more formally the reduced form or solved representation of an FTPL model may in form be
indistinguishable from that of an orthodox model; this is true of both single equation implications of the
model and complete solutions of it.
We meet this problem head on in this paper by setting up both these two models and testing each
against the data using Indirect Inference. This procedure, in outline, uses a descriptive model of the
data, the `auxiliary' model, to act as the summary of data behaviour, shared by any structural model
that is a candidate to generate the data. Then each candidate model is simulated to see whether it could
be the generating mechanism for this data behaviour in its exact quantitative manifestation.
We go in detail below into how this still unfamiliar procedure works. However, before we do so, we
should explain why we do not choose alternative, more familiar evaluative procedures. First, we deviate
from the popular use of Bayesian methods in evaluating models. Our reason is that Bayesian evaluation
(by marginal likelihood and odds ratio tests) does not test any model as a whole against the data; indeed
Bayesians dismiss the idea of `testing models'. What Bayesian evaluation does is estimate the model
assuming the truth of the prior distributions and the model structure; then one variant of the model may,
on those assumptions, turn out to be more probable. But the model in question may still be rejected,
assumptions and all, by the data. Furthermore, a model which is `less probable' under these assumptions
than another model, may not be rejected, or may be rejected at a lower condence level, than the other
by the data. Thus Bayesian methods cannot be used to test whole models against the data - our aim
here, where the issue is whether either or both of these two models t the facts of this episode.
Bayesians may still argue that it is wrong to do what we do here: that one should not test models as a
whole against the data but rather only check improvements conditional on prior assumptions which should
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not be challenged. However, in macroeconomics it is hard to argue that any set of prior assumptions
can be taken for granted as true and beyond challenge. This can be seen from the number of `schools
of thought' still in existence in macroeconomics; this situation of a wide divergence of beliefs has been
exacerbated by the nancial crisis of the late 2000s. Furthermore, the two models being compared here
are so dierent that it is hard to see what common and unchallengeable prior distributions could be found
to impose on them.
Second, as our test of these two models against the data we choose indirect inference over the widely-
used direct inference tests based on the data likelihood, such as the Likelihood Ratio test. The reasons
for this choice, which we elaborate below, are partly that it tests the model's causality which is of greatest
interest to users such as policymakers, rather than its forecasting ability which is of much less interest
to them; partly that it has more power than direct inference in small samples and by implication that it
will provide more powerful discrimination between the models.
Our paper is organised as follows. We review the history of UK policy during the 1970s in section 2;
in this section we establish a narrative that suggests the FTPL could have been at work. In section 3 we
set up the model of FTPL that could apply for this UK episode; side by side with it we set out a rival
Orthodox model in which monetary policy is governed by a Taylor Rule and scal policy is Ricardian.
In section 4 we explain the method of indirect inference. In section 5 we discuss the data and the results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The nature of UK policy during the 1970s
From WWII until its breakdown in 1970 the Bretton Woods system governed the UK exchange rate and
hence its monetary policy. While exchange controls gave some moderate freedom to manage interest rates
away from foreign rates without the policy being overwhelmed by capital movements, such freedom was
mainly only for the short term; the setting of interest rates was dominated in the longer term by the need
to control the balance of payments suciently to hold the sterling exchange rate. Pegging the exchange
rate implied that the price level was also pegged to the foreign price level. Through this mechanism
monetary policy ensured price level determinacy. Fiscal policy was therefore disciplined by the inability
to shift the price level from this trajectory and also by the consequent xing of the home interest rate to
the foreign level. While this discipline could in principle be overthrown by scal policy forcing a series
of devaluations, the evidence suggests that this did not happen; there were just two devaluations during
the whole post-war period up to 1970, in 1949 and 1967. On both occasions a Labour government viewed
the devaluation as a one-o change permitting a brief period of monetary and scal ease, to be followed
by a return to the previous regime.
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However, after the collapse of Bretton Woods, the UK moved in a series of steps to a oating exchange
rate. Initially sterling was xed to continental currencies through a European exchange rate system known
as `the snake in the tunnel', designed to hold rates within a general range (the tunnel) and if possible
even closer (the snake). Sterling proved dicult to keep within these ranges, and was in practice kept
within a range against the dollar at an `eective' (currency basket) rate. Finally it was formally oated
in June 1972.
UK monetary policy was not given a new nominal target to replace the exchange rate. Instead the
Conservative government of Edward Heath assigned the determination of ination to wage and price
controls. A statutory `incomes policy' was introduced in late 1972. After the 1974 election the incoming
Labour government set up a `voluntary incomes policy', buttressed by food subsidies and cuts in indirect
tax rates. Fiscal policy was expansionary until 1975 and monetary policy was accommodative, with
interest rates kept low to encourage falling unemployment. In 1976 the Labour government invited the
IMF to stabilise the falling sterling exchange rate; the IMF terms included the setting of targets for
Domestic Credit Expansion. These were largely met by a form of control on deposits (the `corset') which
forced banks to reduce deposits in favour of other forms of liability. But by 1978 these restraints had
eectively been abandoned and prices and incomes controls reinstated in the context of a pre-election
scal and monetary expansion - see Minford (1993), Nelson (2003) and Meenagh et al. (2009b) for further
discussions of the UK policy environment for this and other post-war UK periods.
Our description of policy suggests that the role of the nominal anchor for ination may have been
played during the 1970s by scal policy, if only because monetary policy was not given this task and was
purely accommodative. Thus this episode appears on the face of it to be a good candidate for FTPL to
apply.
3 An FTPL Model for the UK in the 1970s
We assume that the UK nances its decit by issuing nominal perpetuities, each paying one pound
per period and whose present value is therefore 1Rtwhere Rt is the long-term rate of interest. We use
perpetuities here rather than the usual one-period bond because of the preponderance of long-term bonds
in the UK debt issue: the average maturity of UK debt at this time was approximately ten years. All
bonds at this time were nominal (indexed bonds were not issued until 1981).
The government budget constraint can then be written as
(1) Bt+1Rt = Gt   Tt +Bt + BtRt
where Gt is government spending in money terms, Tt is government taxation in money terms, Bt is
the number of perpetuities issued. Note that when perpetuities are assumed the debt interest in period
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t is Bt while the stock of debt at the start of period t has the value during the period of
Bt
Rt
; end-period
debt therefore has the value Bt+1Rt : Note too the perpetuity interest rate is by construction expected to
remain constant into the future.
We can derive the implied value of current bonds outstanding by substituting forwards for future
bonds outstanding:
(2) BtRt = Et
P1
i=0 (Tt+i  Gt+i) 1(1+Rt)i+1
We represent this equation in terms of each period's expected `permanent' tax and spending share, tt
and gt, and assume that EtTt+i = ttEtPt+iyt+i and EtGt+i = gtEtPt+iyt+i:
We can then simplify (2) (see Appendix) to:
(3) Bt
RtP tyt
=
(tt gt)
(1++t)(rt )
where Rt = r

t + t (respectively the perpetuity real interest rate and perpetuity ination rate, both
`permanent' variables),  is the growth rate of equilibrium real GDP , yt (which is a random walk with
this as its drift term). All these expected permanent variables are by construction expected to be constant
in the future at today's level.
The pricing condition on bonds in equation (3) thus sets their value consistently with expected future
primary surpluses. Suppose now the government reduces the present value of future primary surpluses. At
an unchanged real value of the debt this would be a `non-Ricardian' scal policy move. According to the
FTPL prices will adjust to reduce the real value of the debt to ensure the government budget constraint
holds and thus the solvency condition is met. This is to be compared with the normal Ricardian situation,
in which scal surpluses are endogenous so that scal shocks today lead to adjustments in future surpluses,
the price level remaining unaected.
Since the pricing equation sets the ratio of debt value to GDP equal to a function of permanent
variables, it follows that this ratio bt follows a random walk
1 such that:
(4) bt =
Bt
RtP tyt
= Etbt+1 and (5) bt = t, an i:i:d:process.
This in turn allows us to solve for the ination shock as a function of other shocks (especially shocks to
government tax and spending). With the number of government bonds issued, Bt;being pre-determined
(issued last period) and therefore known at t   1, equation (3) could be written as follows (taking logs
and letting log xuet = log xt   Et 1 log xt, the unexpected change in log xt)
(6) log buet =   logRuet   logP
ue
t   log yuet [LHS of equation (3)]
= log
 
tt   gt
ue   log (1 + t + )ue   log(rt   )ue [RHS of equation (3)]
With all the variables in the equation dened to follow a random walk, and making the approximative
assumption that the actual and permanent ination are the same, we can rewrite the above expression
1A `permanent' variable xt is by denition a variable expected not to change in the future so that Et xt+1 = xt. Thus
xt+1 = xt + t+1, where t+1 is an iid error making the process a random walk.
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as approximately (note that for small , log (1 + t + )
ue  uet = logP
ue
t )
(7)   log (t + rt )  log yt =  log(tt   gt)  log(rt   )
Using a rst-order Taylor Series expansion around the sample means we can obtain a solution for t
as a function of change in government expenditure and tax rates
(8) t = (gt  tt) + rt    log yt
where  = +r

t g ;  =
+
r  ;  =  + r
; , r, t and g are sample mean values of the corresponding
variables. We can integrate (8) to obtain:
(9)t = (gt   tt) + c+ rt +  log yt
Tax and spending ratios are assumed to deviate from their permanent values according to error
processes (which must be stationary by construction). Thus
(10) (gt  tt) = (gt  tt)+ t: Since by construction a permanent variable is a random walk, this gives
us:
(11) (gt   tt) = (gt   tt) + t = errg tt
where errg tt is a stationary error process. We may now note that there is some unknown error
process by which actual ination is related to permanent ination: thus t = t + t: We use (9) for the
determinants of t and since we cannot observe (r

t + log y

t ) we include this in the total error process,
errpit , so that nally our FTPL model for ination is:
(12) t = (gt   tt) + c + errpit
We can now complete the DSGE model by adding a forward-looking IS curve, derived in the usual
way from the household Euler equation and the goods market-clearing condition, and a New Keynesian
Phillips Curve2:
(13) yt   yt = Et(yt+1   yt+1)  1 (Rst   Ett+1) + errISt
(14) t = (yt   yt ) + Ett+1 + errPPt
Note that the interest rate in the IS curve, Rst , is the usual short term rate. Also we can see that since
(12) sets ination, (14) will solve for output and (13) will solve for interest rates. Equilibrium output,
yt , approximated in the FTPL derivation as a random walk, is represented empirically by the H-P lter
of output and estimated as an I(1) process:
(15) yt   yt 1 = cy + (yt 1   yt 2) + erryt
The permanent real interest rate is absorbed into the error term of the IS curve, as it was into that
of (12) for ination.
The FTPL model thus consists of equations (11)-(15).
2One might well argue that for FTPL a more natural assumption would be a New Classical Phillips Curve, in which there
is price exibility. It turns out, as we conrm below in the empirical results section, that it makes virtually no dierence.
This can be seen if one solves for output from (14); the only dierence to the solution will come from having (t  Et 1t)
on the RHS instead of (t  Ett+1). These expressions are very similar in practice.
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3.1 An Orthodox model:
To construct the Orthodox model we jettison equations (11) and (12) above in favour of a Taylor Rule to
set Rst and a Ricardian scal equation that restores the decit to some equilibrium level. Thus in place
of these we have:
(12)'
Rst = (1  )[rss + t + xgap(yt   yt )] + Rst 1 + errR
S
t
and
(11)'
4(gt   tt) =  [(g   t)t 1   cg t] + errg tt 0
3.2 Model identication
It would be reasonable to ask whether a macroeconomic model of a few equations like the ones here can
be considered to be identied. Le et al. (2013) examined this issue for a three equation New Keynesian
model of the sort being considered here. They found that it was likely to be heavily over-identied.
Thus there were many more coecients in the reduced form than in the structural model; under normal
assumptions this should give several sets of estimates of the structural coecients from the reduced form.
With enough data these sets would coincide and so even a partial reduced form should be sucient
to yield a set of structural parameter estimates. In that paper they went further and sought to nd
alternative structural parameter sets that could generate the same reduced form; using indirect inference
they were able to establish that no other sets could exist. These results suggest that we can regard each
of the two models here as over-identied, implying that there is no chance of confusing the reduced form
of the one with the reduced form of the other.
We can demonstrate this by a Monte Carlo experiment in which we assume that the FTPL model
is true (we give it the parameters similar to those we later estimate for it) and using the FTPL error
properties we generate 1,000 samples of data from it (of the same length as in our 1970s sample here - 28
quarters) and calculate the VECM approximate reduced form from it. We now ask whether any Orthodox
model could generate the same data and hence the same VECM reduced form, using the indirect inference
test at 95% condence; if indeed it could do so, thus eectively being the same model, then we would
reject exactly the same percent of the time as we reject the true FTPL model - namely 5%. In fact we
reject it for 51% of the samples; thus it cannot be the same model (table 1. We also did the reverse,
and found the same, rejecting about 20% of the time). In doing this check we have searched over a wide
range of parameter values using the SA algorithm, starting from the estimated parameters:
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Table 1: Identication check: FTPL vs Orthodox Taylor
When the true model is
Rejection rate (at 95% condence level)
of the false model
FTPL 51.3% (Orthodox)
Orthodox 19.7% (FTPL)
This does not contradict the general problem we noted at the start that the two models have similar
reduced forms. In particular it is easy to show (see below and Le et al., 2013) that the general solution
of these models can in both cases be represented as a VARMA supplemented by coecients on the
exogenous stochastic and deterministic trends. Thus there is no formal dierence between the two models'
reduced forms; though of course the reduced forms can be distinguished according to particular numerical
restrictions on their coecients. These restrictions will dier according to the details of each model, so
that no generic restriction can be proposed that would correspond only to one type of model, such as the
FTPL. Thus estimating a particular set of reduced form equations (let alone any single equation forming
part of the reduced form) cannot on its own distinguish the two models, as has usually been assumed in
empirical work on the FTPL. To distinguish them one needs to know what numerical parameter values
would be found in these reduced forms according to each model. It is this that the indirect inference
procedure allows us to do, as we now go on to explain.
4 The method of Indirect Inference
We evaluate the model's capacity in tting the data using the method of Indirect Inference originally
proposed in Meenagh et al. (2009a) and subsequently with a number of renements by Le et al. (2011)
who evaluate the method using Monte Carlo experiments. The approach employs an auxiliary model that
is completely independent of the theoretical one to produce a description of the data against which the
performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly. Such a description can be summarised either by the
estimated parameters of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we will call these the descriptors
of the data. While these are treated as the `reality', the theoretical model being evaluated is simulated
to nd its implied values for them.
Indirect inference has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., Smith, 1993,
Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux et al., 1993, Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova,
2005). Here we make a further use of indirect inference, to evaluate an already estimated or calibrated
structural model. The common element is the use of an auxiliary time series model. In estimation
the parameters of the structural model are chosen such that when this model is simulated it generates
estimates of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained from the actual data. The optimal choices of
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parameters for the structural model are those that minimise the distance between a given function of
the two sets of estimated coecients of the auxiliary model. Common choices of this function are the
actual coecients, the scores or the impulse response functions. In model evaluation the parameters of
the structural model are taken as given. The aim is to compare the performance of the auxiliary model
estimated on simulated data derived from the given estimates of a structural model - which is taken as
a true model of the economy, the null hypothesis - with the performance of the auxiliary model when
estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is correct then its predictions about the impulse
responses, moments and time series properties of the data should statistically match those based on the
actual data. The comparison is based on the distributions of the two sets of parameter estimates of the
auxiliary model, or of functions of these estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves rst constructing the errors implied by the previously esti-
mated/calibrated structural model and the data. These are called the structural errors and are backed
out directly from the equations and the data3. These errors are then bootstrapped and used to generate
for each bootstrap new data based on the structural model. An auxiliary time series model is then tted
to each set of data and the sampling distribution of the coecients of the auxiliary time series model is
obtained from these estimates of the auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to determine whether
functions of the parameters of the time series model estimated on the actual data lie in some condence
interval implied by this sampling distribution.
The auxiliary model should be a process that would describe the evolution of the data under any
relevant model. It is known that for non-stationary data the reduced form of a macro model is a VARMA
where non-stationary forcing variables enter as conditioning variables to achieve cointegration (i.e. en-
suring that the stochastic trends in the endogenous vector are picked up so that the errors in the VAR
are stationary). This in turn can be approximated as a VECM4. So following Meenagh et al. (2012)
3Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here to initiate the tests is the robust
instrumental variables estimation suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous data
as instruments and calculate the tted values from a VAR(1) { this also being the auxiliary model chosen in what follows.
Once the search procedure (eectively indirect estimation) has converged on the best model parameters, we then move to
generating the expectations exactly implied by the parameters and the data, and use these to calculate the errors, which
are then the exact errors implied by the model and data. The reason we do not use this `exact' method at the start is that
initially when the model is far from the data, the expectations generated are also far from the true ones, so that the errors
are exaggerated and the procedure may not converge.
4Following Meenagh et al. (2012), we can say that after log-linearisation a DSGE model can usually be written in the
form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt +D(L)et (A1)
where yt are p endogenous variables and xt are q exogenous variables which we assume are driven by
xt = a(L)xt 1 + d+ c(L)t: (A2)
The exogenous variables may contain both observable and unobservable variables such as a technology shock. The distur-
bances et and t are both iid variables with zero means. It follows that both yt and xt are non-stationary. L denotes the
lag operator zt s = Lszt and A(L), B(L) etc. are polynomial functions with roots outside the unit circle.
The general solution of yt is
yt = G(L)yt 1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t: (A3)
where the polynomial functions have roots outside the unit circle. As yt and xt are non-stationary, the solution has the p
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we use as the auxiliary model a VECM which we reexpress as a VAR(1) for the four macro variables
(interest rate, output, ination and the primary budget decit, with a time trend and with yt entered
as the exogenous non-stationary `productivity trend' (these two elements having the eect of achieving
cointegration). Thus our auxiliary model in practice is given by: yt = [I   K]yt 1 + xt 1 + gt + vt
where xt 1 is the stochastic trend in productivity, gt are the deterministic trends, and vt are the VECM
innovations. We treat as the descriptors of the data all the VAR coecients and the VAR error variances,
so that the Wald statistic is computed from these. Thus eectively we are testing whether the observed
dynamics, volatility and cointegrating relations of the chosen variables are explained by the simulated
joint distribution of these at a given condence level. The Wald statistic is given by:
(  )0
X 1
()
(  ) (1)
where  is the vector of VAR estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation, with  andP
() representing the corresponding sample means and variance-covariance matrix of these calculated
across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of the  is obtained by bootstrapping the innovations implied by the data and
the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample distribution5. Such a distribution
cointegration relations
yt = [I  G(1)] 1[H(1)xt + f ]
= xt + g: (A4)
The long-run solution to the model is
yt = xt + g
xt = [1  a(1)] 1[dt+ c(1)t]
t = 
t 1
i=0t s
Hence the long-run solution to xt, namely, xt = xDt + x
S
t has a deterministic trend x
D
t = [1   a(1)] 1dt and a stochastic
trend xSt = [1  a(1)] 1c(1)t.
The solution for yt can therefore be re-written as the VECM
yt =  [I  G(1)](yt 1  xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t
=  [I  G(1)](yt 1  xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f + !t (A5)
!t = M(L)et +N(L)t
Hence, in general, the disturbance !t is a mixed moving average process. This suggests that the VECM can be approximated
by the VARX
yt = K(yt 1  xt 1) +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + g + t (A6)
where t is an iid zero-mean process.
As
xt = xt 1 + [1  a(1)] 1[d+ t]
the VECM can also be written as
yt = K[(yt 1   yt 1) (xt 1   xt 1)] +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + h+ t: (A7)
Either equations (A6) or (A7) can act as the auxiliary model. Here we focus on (A7); this distinguishes between the eect
of the trend element in x and the temporary deviation from its trend. In our models these two elements have dierent
eects and so should be distinguished in the data to allow the greatest test discrimination.
It is possible to estimate (A7) in one stage by OLS. Meenagh et al. (2012) do Monte Carlo experiments to check this
procedure and nd it to be extremely accurate.
5The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the innovations are
preserved.
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is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic distribution; it is also shown to be
consistent by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald statistic is `asymptotically pivotal'; they also showed
it had quite good accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo experiments6.
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the true ones
(H0, the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation, or both. However derived,
the test then asks: could these coecients within this model structure be the true (numerical) model
generating the data? Of course only one true model with one set of coecients is possible. Nevertheless
we may have chosen coecients that are not exactly right numerically, so that the same model with other
coecient values could be correct. Only when we have examined the model with all coecient values
that are feasible within the model theory will we have properly tested it. For this reason we extend our
procedure by a further search algorithm, in which we seek other coecient sets that minimise the Wald
test statistic - in doing this we are carrying out indirect estimation. The indirect estimates of the model
are consistent and asymptotically normal, in common with FIML - see Smith (1993), Gregory and Smith
(1991, 1993), Gourieroux et al., (1993), Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) and Canova (2005).
Thus we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic for each model using a powerful algorithm
based on Simulated Annealing (SA) in which search takes place over a wide range around the initial
values, with optimising search accompanied by random jumps around the space7. The merit of this
extended procedure is that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type when nally
doing our comparison of model compatibility with the data.
4.1 Comparison of indirect inference with alternative methods of model eval-
uation
It may be asked why we use Indirect Inference rather than the now widely-used Bayesian approach to
estimating and testing DSGE models. We considered this frequently-asked question in the opening section
above. As noted there, the Bayesian approach does not test a model as a whole against the data since it
operates entirely under the assumptions that the prior distributions and the model structure are correct.
It would be appropriate to use this approach if we knew that this was the case so that the assumptions
6Specically, they found on stationary data that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the 95% condence
level and 0.6% at the 99% level. Meenagh et al (2012) found even greater accuracy in Monte Carlo experiments on
nonstationary data.
7We use a Simulated Annealing algorithm due to Ingber (1996). This mimics the behaviour of the steel cooling process
in which steel is cooled, with a degree of reheating at randomly chosen moments in the cooling process|this ensuring that
the defects are minimised globally. Similarly the algorithm searches in the chosen range and as points that improve the
objective are found it also accepts points that do not improve the objective. This helps to stop the algorithm being caught in
local minima. We nd this algorithm improves substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm. Our method used
our standard testing method: we take a set of model parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals
from the data using the LIML method, nd their implied autoregressive coecients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the
implied innovations with this full set of parameters to nd the implied Wald value. This is then minimised by the SA
algorithm.
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themselves do not need to be tested; but because of well-known controversies in macroeconomics, this
is not the case. Even a major model like the Smets-Wouters (2007) model of the U.S., that has been
carefully estimated by Bayesian methods, is rejected by our indirect inference test, see Le et al. (2011).
It may then be asked why we use Indirect Inference rather than other available tests of overall
specication, given as explained above that Bayesian methods are simply not available for the task here.
The alternatives are based on the likelihood of the data, and a widely-used one is the Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test ; by contrast our indirect inference test is based on the likelihood of the descriptors of the data.
This test is examined carefully in Le et al. (2012) who nd that the two measures test quite dierent
properties of the model in their check on its misspecication: the LR test is based on a model's in-sample
current forecasting ability whereas the Wald is based on the model's ability to replicate data behaviour,
as found in the VAR coecients and the data variances, reecting the causal processes at work in the
data.
A further nding of Le et al. was that the Wald has substantially more power as a test of mis-
specication than the LR. This is presumably related to the nature of the two tests: models that are
somewhat mis-specied may still be able to forecast well in sample as the error processes will pick up
the eects of mis-specication but mis-specied models will imply a reduced form that diers materially
from the true one, and so therefore a VAR approximation to this that similarly deviates from the VAR
given by the true model. Le et al.'s comparison related to models that were mis-specied in the sense
of having wrong calibrations, even though having the correct model. However in our case here we are
concerned with mis-specication in the sense of having the wrong model, since we allow full estimation
(so that the calibration mistakes should be eliminated). Thus we did a Monte Carlo experiment to check
the power of each test against a mis-specied model, allowing the test to be carried out as here after full
reestimation.
For this experiment we assumed that the true model was FTPL and created 1,000 samples of data
from it, all of the same small size as here (28). We then checked whether a pure Orthodox model, and
thus clearly mis-specied, would if estimated on each data sample then be rejected 5% of the time by this
data. With the Indirect Inference Wald (and indirect estimation by Simulated Annealing) the rejection
rate was 12%; thus even with such a small sample there was power against model mis-specication. With
the LR (and FIML estimation) the rejection rate did not rise above 5%, that of the True model8.
We then repeated the power experiment the other way round, making the Orthodox model the true
one and creating 1000 samples from it. In this case the power is greater, with the Wald test rejecting
8In fact in the case of the LR test we found 4.5%, less than 5%, so that the False model is rejected even less than the
True model. We think what may be happening here is that when the false model is freely reestimated for each true sample a
process of data-mining occurs whereby for each sample the SA algorithm nds a model and set of errors and AR coecients
such that the in-sample forecast of current data is `improved' over what even the True model would achieve.
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20% of the time and the LR test rejecting 22.5% of the time. Thus here the power of the two tests is
comparable.
What we see (tables 2 and 3) is that on average the Wald test has more power against mis-specication
with the small sample being used here. Furthermore it is consistent in having power whereas the LR test
can fail to have any power at all. Nevertheless, perhaps not surprisingly, with such a very small sample
(only 28 observations), the Wald test cannot achieve strong power.
Table 2: Power check of Wald test: FTPL vs Orthodox Taylor
When the true model is
Rejection rate (at 95% condence level)
of the false model
FTPL 11.9% (Orthodox)
Orthodox 19.9% (FTPL)
Table 3: Power check of LR test: FTPL vs Orthodox Taylor
When the true model is
Rejection rate (at 95% condence level)
of the false model
FTPL 4.5% (Orthodox)
Orthodox 22.5% (FTPL)
5 Data and Results
We limit our focus to the period between 1972-1979 during which the FTPL could be a potential candidate
given the economic background. We use unltered (but seasonally adjusted) data from ocial sources.
We dene as Rst the Minimum Lending Rates, and as t the percentage change in the CPI index, both
in quarterly term. We use for yt the real GDP level in natural logorithm and for y

t its trend values as
suggested by the H-P lter. The primary decit ratio g  t is simply the dierence between G=GDP and
T=GDP , where G and T are respectively the levels of government spending and tax income. In particular,
since for model convergence the amount of government spending is required to be less than taxation for
government bonds to have a positive value, and that government spending on a capital variety is expected
to produce future returns in line with real interest rates, we deduct the trend in such spending from the
trend in G=GDP . By implementing this we assume that the average share of expenditure devoted to
xed capital, health and education in the period can be regarded as the (constant) trend in such capital
spending; of course the `capital' element in total government spending is unobservable and hence our
assumption is intended merely to adjust the level of g in an approximate way but not its movement over
time which we regard as accurately capturing changes in such spending. This adjustment counts for
about 10% of GDP. Note that the primary decit is therefore negative (i.e. there is a primary surplus
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Figure 1: UK Data (1972-1979)
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throughout). Figure 1 plots the time series.
We now turn to the empirical performance of the competing models outlined above as suggested by
the method of Indirect Inference. We summarise the model estimates (by Simulated Annealing) in table
4 (The Wald test results based on these are shown in table 8 in what follows).
Table 4: Indirect estimates of the FTPL and the Orthodox models
Model parameter Starting value FTPL Orthodox Taylor
 2.4 4.07 1.96
 0.99 xed xed
 2.27 0.02 0.46
 0.26 0.35 -
 0.5 - 0.76
 2 - 1.31
xgap 0.125 - 0.06
 0.003 - 0.007
cy 0.0002 xed xed
 0.99 xed xed
Shock persistence
errpp - 0.43 0.42
errIS - 0.64 0.84
erry - 0.93 0.93
errg t - -0.1 -0.1
err - 0.24 -
errR
S
- - 0.34
The estimates for the two models' shared parameters ( and ) are strikingly dierent. In the FTPL
 is high and  is low, implying a steep Phillips curve and a at IS curve. Since ination is determined
exogenously by the exogenous decit ratio and its own error process, the steep Phillips curve (which
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Figure 2: IRFs - Output (FTPL)
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Figure 3: IRFs - Ination (FTPL)
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determines the output gap) implies that the output gap responds weakly to ination while the at IS
curve (which sets interest rates) implies that the real interest rate responds weakly to the output gap.
The impulse response functions for the FTPL model (gures 2-5) conrm this9.
Eectively this suppresses most of the simultaneity in the model as can be seen from the variance
decomposition in table 5. We nd this by bootstrapping the innovations of the model repeatedly for the
same sample episode - plainly the variances of non-stationary variables, while undened asymptotically,
9In this model the eect of IS curve shock on output and ination is nil.
Figure 4: IRFs - Nom. int. rates (FTPL)
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Figure 5: IRFs - Real int. rates (FTPL)
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are dened for this (short) sample period. One sees that ination is disturbed by both the scal decit
and its own shock; output by both the productivity trend and the supply (errPP ) shock, with a minimal
eect from the ination shock; real interest rates entirely by its own (errIS) shock; nominal interest rates
respond to a mixture of shocks because they combine ination and real interest rates.
Table 5: Variance decomposition (FTPL)
Unit: % y  R r
errIS : 0 0 23.1 99.9
errPP : 79.1 0 0 0.1
err: 2.2 67.1 8 0
erry: 18.7 0 0 0
errg t: 0 32.9 68.9 0
Total: 100 100 100 100
On the other hand, the estimates for the Orthodox model imply a standard Phillips Curve and also
a fairly at IS curve. The Taylor Rule has fairly standard New Keynesian responses to ination (1.3)
and the output gap (0.06), implying a at response of interest rates to output gap movement. There is
also a weak Ricardian scal plan, with the decit converging extremely slowly ( = 0:007). In this model
the macro-economy is orthogonal to the scal decit but there is considerable simultaneity otherwise.
Shocks to demand (IS), supply (PP) and monetary policy (RS) each move all four macro variables in a
relatively normal way, as can be seen from the impulse responses10 (gures 6-9) and also the variance
decomposition (carried out just as for FTPL) in table 6. To replicate the data behaviour in this episode,
with its large swings in ination, the model nds large monetary policy (errR
s
) shocks which need to
be moderated by Taylor Rule interest rate responses to limit ination variation; these shocks dominate
ination variance which triggers the Taylor Rule response limiting the eects on real interest rates and
output. Demand (errIS) shocks trigger ination and Taylor Rule responses, so largely aecting interest
rate variance. Supply (errPP ) shocks trigger sharp ination responses which are largely neutralised by
10In this model the eect of decit errors are nil on output, ination, and both nominal and real interest rates.
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Figure 6: IRFs - Output (Orthodox Taylor)
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Figure 7: IRFs - Ination (Orthodox Taylor)
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real interest rate responses; these in turn destabilise output, given the at IS curve.
5.1 What do the tests show about the two models?
We may now consider the way in which each model replicates the VECM estimates on the data, as shown
in table 7.
One thing the table immediately conrms is that both models have VAR representations (plus trend
eects and error variances - we will call this VAR+) that are formally similar to each other's and also in
Figure 8: IRFs - Nom. int. rates (Orthodox Taylor)
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Figure 9: IRFs - Real int. rates (Orthodox Taylor)
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Table 6: Variance decomposition (Orthodox Taylor)
Unit: % y  R r
errIS : 8.9 33.3 93.2 62.8
errPP : 58.8 6.1 4.9 20.8
errR
S
: 16.8 60.1 1.9 16.3
erry: 15.5 0 0 0
errg t: 0 0 0 0
Total: 100 100 100 100
general in most cases embrace the actual data coecients. This illustrates the formal similarity of the
two models in terms of their data representation, already noted in our discussion of the identication
problem: there is no a priori qualitative or numerical restriction we can apply to any VAR+ coecient(s)
that would reect one model and not the other. Instead we rely on the joint distribution of all these
VAR+ coecients to dier in numerical detail across the two models, as we know they do from our
identication discussion above: we then ask via the Wald test whether the joint distribution of each
model could contain the joint values found on the data. These tests are shown in table 8.
The table suggests that when the models are asked to t all elements of the VAR+, both models
pass the Wald test at 95% condence level. Both models deal very well with volatility. On trend and
dynamics, the Orthodox passes comfortably while the FTPL is on the margin of rejection. It is in fact
hard to establish much of a dierence between the two models; though the p-value of the Orthodox model
on the all-elements test is about double that on the FTPL, this is not a wide margin. Both models in
eect marginally fail to be rejected overall11.
However, we know that it is impossible for both models to be true, having checked that they are
identied. Thus this interesting result could mean that one of the two models is true but the other one,
though false, cannot be rejected because there is insucient power with the small sample here; or it
could mean that both models are false and a third model that lies somewhere between the two is true.
11The results for the FTPL with the New Classical aggregate supply curve in place of the NKPC are essentially the same.
We show this comparison in the appendix.
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Table 7: VECM estimates: actual vs model simulations
VECM parameter Actual FTPL lower FTPL upper Ortho. lower Ortho. upper
yt on
yt 1 -0.2740 -0.2835 0.6072 -0.2551 0.6552
t 1 -0.3808 -0.6171 0.4384 -0.6558 0.3253
Rst 1 -0.3502 -1.9803 1.5379 -2.3809 1.0812
(g   t)t 1 0.7864 -1.1111 0.8165 -1.0967 0.8337
yt 1 3.2576 -2.8302 4.1891 -3.0749 4.0808
Trend -0.0089 -0.0069 0.0082 -0.0079 0.0074
t on
yt 1 0.3353 -0.5080 0.4907 -0.3631 0.6922
t 1 0.3231 -0.4205 0.4520 -0.4481 0.3925
Rst 1 1.4273 -1.0472 2.1947 -0.8633 2.5227
(g   t)t 1 0.2311 -0.5509 1.3207 -0.7512 1.1868
yt 1 -0.5633 -2.7752 3.6503 -3.4731 3.1963
Trend 0.0011 -0.0072 0.0072 -0.0075 0.0069
Rst on
yt 1 -0.0400 -0.1318 0.1111 -0.0591 0.1801
t 1 -0.0424 -0.2102 0.0393 -0.1588 0.0612
Rst 1 0.7967 -0.0015 0.7597 -0.2494 0.9357
(g   t)t 1 0.1672 -0.0162 0.4023 -0.2041 0.2378
yt 1 0.3204 -0.8594 0.9110 -0.8656 0.7144
Trend -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0019 -0.0024 0.0011
(g   t)t on
yt 1 0.2262 -0.2832 0.3029 -0.3041 0.3116
t 1 0.1545 -0.3164 0.2785 -0.2908 0.2658
Rst 1 -0.3739 -1.0098 0.9270 -1.1319 1.0838
(g   t)t 1 0.4939 -0.0605 0.8611 -0.1124 0.8305
yt 1 -0.6407 -2.9531 2.7286 -3.2408 2.5242
Trend 0.0017 -0.0057 0.0060 -0.0062 0.0077
V ar(residy) 1.8010 4 0.8510 4 3.1810 4 0.7410 4 3.0910 4
V ar(resid) 1.2710 4 0.7010 4 2.8510 4 0.5910 4 2.8910 4
V ar(residR
S
) 0.1010 4 0.0510 4 0.1510 4 0.0410 4 0.1310 4
V ar(residg t) 0.6810 4 0.1810 4 1.1110 4 0.1710 4 1.1510 4
*: number lying beyond the lower/upper bound.
In this case both models could have enough elements of truth in them not to be rejected. This would
suggest that some combination of the two, combining these elements, could be closer to the true model
than either alone.
This was, as should have been clear from our earlier discussion of the context, a period of great
uncertainty in UK economics and politics; in 1975 there was even a proposal by certain Labour politicians
led by Tony Benn, a leading minister in the government, to install a siege economy (eectively to insulate
an FTPL strategy from external pressures), and this was only narrowly defeated within the Labour
government. It may therefore well be that people gave some probability to an FTPL regime continuing
and some to an orthodox regime reasserting itself - in the manner described by Leeper (1991).
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Table 8: Wald tests of the FTPL and the Orthodox models
Elements tested FTPL Orthodox
Trend and dynamcis
(VECM coe. only)
95.2
(.048)
89.4
(.106)
Volatility
(VECM resid. only)
6.4
(.936)
11.8
(.882)
All elements
(VECM coe.+resid.)
93
(.07)
86.7
(.133)
Note: p-values in parentheses; p-value = (100-Wald percentile)/100.
5.2 Results for a combined model
The above suggests that ination behaviour was being inuenced by expectations of two potential regimes
each with a certain probability. Ination in this model equals expected ination because no information
lag is assumed. Hence we can think of the FTPL ination equation as showing the ination that would be
expected (and would also occur) at time t if the FTPL regime was in operation. Similarly for the Orthodox
model we can think of the Taylor Rule equation as dening the ination that would be permitted by the
rule (and so would also occur) at prevailing interest rates; thus this would be the ination expected if
the Orthodox regime was prevailing. We can therefore create a model in which ination expectations are
governed by the probability-weighted ination rate under the two regimes; this will be also the actual
ination, since actual = expected. In this model ination will thus be a weighted combination of the two
models' ination equations - the FTPL and the Taylor Rule equations:
t = W
FTPL(gt   tt)
+[1 WFTPL] 1

[
1
(1  ) (Rt   Rt 1)  xgap(yt   y

t )  ] + errWeighted t
Given that ination is determined by the probability-weighted average of each regime's own ination
outcome, we now have a composite ination error - which in principle consists of the weighted combi-
nation of the two regime error processes plus any temporary deviations of ination from this weighted
combination (e.g. due to variation in the weight). Since we cannot observe what the ination rate actually
was in each regime, only the average outcome, we can only observe a composite error.
All the other equations are the same, with the exception of the scal decit equation which has an AR
coecient that is so close to zero that it cannot resolve the uncertainty about which regime is operating;
we allow it to be determined by the model estimation.
When we examine the results of this weighted model (as we report in tables 9 and 10 in comparison
to the earlier results), we see that it improves on both models alone, giving a weight on FTPL of 0.34.
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The improvement comes in tting the trend and dynamics, as all the models have little diculty tting
the volatility in the data. The model now adopts a very at Phillips Curve, a very steep IS Curve, and
a tough Taylor Rule (with high response to ination and virtually no response to the output gap). The
eect of the FTPL decit mechanism is strong, as the one-third weight allows the direct eect of the
decit on ination to be about ve times as high.
Table 9: Indirect estimates of the models: Weighted vs FTPL Orthodox
Model parameter FTPL Orthodox Taylor Weighted model
 4.07 1.96 0.07
 xed xed xed
 0.02 0.46 4.38
 0.35 - 1.75
 - 0.76 0.69
 - 1.31 3.93
xgap - 0.06 0.01
 - 0.007 0.005
cy xed xed xed
 xed xed xed
Weight 0.34
Shock persistence
errpp 0.43 0.42 0.28
errIS 0.64 0.84 0.47
erry 0.93 0.93 0.95
errg t -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
err 0.24 - -
errR
S
- 0.34 -
errWeighted  - - 0.26
Table 10: P-values of the models: Weighted vs FTPL Orthodox
Elements tested FTPL Orthodox Weighted model
Trend and dynamcis
(VECM coe. only)
4.8 10.6 11.5
Volatility
(VECM resid. only)
93.6 88.2 88.2
All elements
(VECM coe.+resid.)
7 13.3 15.8
Note: p-values in %; Wald percentile = 100 - p-value.
The blend of Orthodox with FTPL is revealed in the IRFs (gures 10-13). The IS and PP shocks
aect the economy much as in the Orthodox case. A positive weighted ination error is a combination
of a direct temporary shock to ination as in the FTPL model with an easing of monetary policy in
the Taylor Rule error. The scal shock behaves as in the FTPL model, strongly aecting ination and
nominal interest rates.
The resulting variance decomposition (table 11) gives the supply shock and the weighted ination
shocks about an equal role in output variability; the latter includes both monetary policy and exogenous
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Figure 10: IRFs - Output (Weighted model)
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Figure 11: IRFs - Ination (Weighted model)
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Figure 12: IRFs - Nom. int. rates (Weighted model)
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Figure 13: IRFs - Real int. rates (Weighted model)
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Figure 14: Structural errors (Weighted model)
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ination shock. These two shocks also share the main role in real and nominal interest rate variability
(the scal shock also contributes an eighth to the nominal rate). For ination variability the scal shock
becomes dominant, with the supply shock providing the rest. What we see here in the weighted model is
that the FTPL inuences remain important.
Table 11: Variance decomposition (Weighted model)
Unit: % y  R r
errIS : 14.2 0.4 1 0.9
errPP : 40.4 28.1 46.9 47.6
errWeighted : 36.8 3.2 40 50.4
erry: 6 0 0 0
errg t: 2.6 68.3 12.1 1.1
Total: 100 100 100 100
In the next section we review the implications of this successful weighted model for the causes of
what happened quarter by quarter. Clearly, huge errors in policy were made, to permit the large rise in
ination and the prolonged recession both to occur during the mid-1970s. In our nal concluding section,
we reect on the policy lessons and how they were absorbed subsequently in UK political choices.
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6 A time-line of the UK 1970s episode according to the weighted
models
We see rst the errors backed out period by period in gure 14. Begin with the ination error in the
weighted FTPL/Taylor Rule equation. This is some combination of monetary policy and exogenous
ination (notably commodity price) shocks; the 1973 and 1974 peaks were both periods of expansionary
money and surging commodity prices. 1977's low point corresponds to the IMF visit, which tightened
money sharply. Next, we note that the PP shock mirrors this weighted ination error closely; this is
because with a very at Phillips Curve movements in ination are governed almost solely by expected
ination for next quarter; but since the scal decit is close to a random walk this turns out to be very
close to current expected ination which too is dominated by the current scal decit. The IS shock
turns negative in the mid-1970s before recovering in the late 1970s. The scal decit shock is large and
positive early on before being restrained later in the period.
In the timeline for output (gure 15) we see that all these shocks play a part; the dominant role,
as foreshadowed by our variance decomposition, is taken by the supply and ination shocks but these
essentially cancel each other out, leaving the IS shock as the factor creating recession and the productivity
shock assisting it in generating later recovery. For ination (gure 16) the scal shock is the key factor
generating the sharp ination explosion from 1973-5, aided by the supply shock. For interest rates (gure
17), scal, supply and ination shocks all three are major factors, but tend to cancel each other out, so
that interest rates move little; this is consistent with the model's nding that monetary policy itself had
only a small eect on ination during the period, because although the weight on the Taylor Rule is high
at 0.66 the Taylor Rule terms themselves vary little - interest rates move little while the movement in
them required to restrain ination (as implied by the high ination response coecient) is large.
Thus the overall picture of the period from our weighted model is that the scal decit was a key
factor in driving ination expectations and that monetary policy in practice did little to moderate these;
interest rates varied little. Output was the victim of poor productivity growth and the demand shocks
of the mid-1970s, with these both improving somewhat later in the period.
From these timelines it is clear that poor expected macro policy choices, both scal and monetary,
reinforced the bad results already created by the poor growth of productivity. The two factors together
produced economic results so bad that the British voters backed Margaret Thatcher's radical policy
changes over a whole decade, embracing not merely macro-policy but also supply-side policy reforms.
Whether the voters would have backed her had the economy not been in such a parlous condition in 1979
is a matter of intense interest for political economy but clearly lies well outside the scope of this paper.
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Figure 15: Time-line for output (Weighted model)
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Figure 16: Time-line for ination (Weighted model)
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Figure 17: Time-line for nom. int. rates (Weighted model)
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined an episode of UK history when scal policy may have been set without
thought for future solvency implications and monetary policy may have been entirely accommodative - a
case of the scal theory of the price level. Because the data implications of this theory are qualitatively
similar to those of the Orthodox theory in which monetary policy is set by a Taylor Rule to hit an
ination target and scal policy is set to achieve solvency at that ination rate, we have set up the two
theories as rival structural models and tested each against the behaviour found in the data, by the method
of Indirect Inference. Our nding is that neither model is rejected by the data and that the Orthodox
model can account better for the data behaviour than the FTPL; but also that the best account of
the period assumes that expectations were a probability-weighted combination of the two regimes. The
policies pursued in this episode generated generally high as well as volatile ination, together with weak
productivity growth and a long-lived recession. They paved the way for a decisive change of approach to
both scal and monetary policy after the election of 1979.
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AppendixA Derivation of Government Budget Constraint
The government budget constraint gives us
Bt+1
Rt
= Gt   Tt +Bt + BtRt
Where,
Gt is the government spending in money terms,
Tt is the government taxation in money terms,
Rt is the amount of nominal interest the government must pay. The value of the bonds outstanding
is B  1R .
We can derive an expression for government budget constraint in the forward direction by substituting
forwards for future bonds outstanding, yields
Bt
Rt
= Et
P1
i=0 (Tt+i  Gt+i) 1(1+Rt)i+1
We approximate this expression by
Bt
Rt
=
P1
i=0
(tt gt)(1+t)iPt(1+)iyt
(1+Rt)
1+i
where tt; gt; t;  are the currently expected permanent values respectively of the tax/GDP and
government spending/GDP ratios, the ination rate, and the growth rate (assumed constant at all times);
P t; yt are respectively the permanent price level and equilibrium output
=
 
tt   gt

P ty

t
P1
i=0
(1++t)
i
(1+Rt)
1+i
=
 
tt   gt

P ty

t
P1
i=0
(1++t)
1+i
(1+Rt)
1+i(1++t)
If  and t are both small enough,P1
i=0
(1++t)
1+i
(1+Rt)
1+i =
P1
i=0

1
1+Rt  t
1+i
=

1
1  1
1+r
t 
  1

=

1
rt 

Hence, Bt
RtP tyt
=
(tt gt)
(1++t)(rt ) .
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AppendixB Estimates and Performance of the FTPL Model
with New Keynesian and New Classical Aggregate
Supply Curves
Panel A
Model parameter FTPL (benchmark NKAS) FTPL (NCAS)
 3.89 3.74
 xed xed
 0.02 0.02
 0.34 0.36
Shock persistence
errPP 0.43 0.43
errIS 0.64 0.64
erry 0.93 0.93
errg t -0.1 -0.1
errpi 0.25 0.24
Panel B
Wald test type FTPL (benchmark NKAS) FTPL (NCAS)
Directed Wald percentile
(VECM coe. only)
89
(0.11)
90.4
(.096)
Directed Wald percentile
(VECM resid. only)
36.6
(.634)
33.9
(.661
Full Wald percentile
(VECM coe.+resid.)
88.8
(0.112)
91.4
(.086)
Note: p-values in parentheses; these are (100-Wald percentile)/100.
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